董事会治理、管理者过度自信与投资效率  

Board Governance, Managerial Overconfidence and Investment Efficiency

作　　者：王艳林[1] 薛鲁[2] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古财经大学会计学院 [2]中国建设银行股份有限公司

出　　处：《投资研究》2014年第3期93-106,共14页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：内蒙古自治区高等学校科研究项目(项目编号:NSY12169)的资助

摘　　要：本文以我国2007-2011年沪深A股4542家上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了在自由现金流充足和自由现金流不足的情况下,董事会治理对过度自信管理者基于自由现金流盈余的过度投资和基于自由现金流缺口的投资不足产生的影响和作用。研究发现,当企业自由现金流充足时,大规模董事会和董事长总经理两职合一加剧了过度自信管理者基于自由现金流盈余的过度投资;而无论企业自由现金流充足与否,独董比例的提高均不能发挥抑制过度自信管理者基于自由现金流的非效率投资行为。Based on the dataset of the listed 4542 companies from 2007 to 2011 in China, the paper investigates the board governance playing role on the relation between of manager overconfidence and investment efficiency on the condition of the free cash flow surplus and free cash flow shortage. We get the following empirical evidences： massive board of directors, general manager and chairman of the board of unity exacerbate the degree of overinvestment based on the adequate free cash flow, But the independent director did not play a governance role based on the free cash flow cash flow regardless of the adequate and shortage cash flow.

关 键 词：董事会治理 管理者过度自信 过度投资 投资不足 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6