闽台农业科技合作中台湾农业企业与台湾农业管理机构的完全信息静态博弈分析  

Static Game of Complete Information Analysis on Taiwan Agricultural Enterprises and Taiwan Management Organizations in the Agricultural Sic-tech Cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan

作　　者：李志杰[1] 刘佳佳[1] 李焕庭[1] 陈琳[1] 曾伶俐[1] 石巧玲[1] 董微[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《台湾农业探索》2014年第2期6-9,共4页Taiwan Agricultural Research

基　　金：全国大学生创新训练项目(201310389032);福建省大学生创新训练项目(111zc3085)

摘　　要：通过构建台湾农业企业与台湾农业管理机构之间的完全信息静态博弈模型,发现台湾农业企业到大陆进行投资概率的大小并不是受企业的收益影响,收益的提高不一定会增加台湾农业管理机构开放政策允许企业到大陆投资的概率,提出优化闽台农业科技合作体系和增强投资软环境优势的对策。By building the static game model of perfect information between Taiwan agro-businesses and Taiwan agricultural management institutions,this paper finds that the probability of investment in Chinese Mainland by Taiwan agro-businesses is not affected by the revenues of the agro-businesses and the revenue increase of Taiwan agricultural management institutions does not necessarily increase the probability of the opening policy of the institutions for allowing Taiwan agro-businesses to invest in Chinese Mainland.The paper puts forward the countermeasures including optimizing the system of agricultural sic-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan and strengthening the advantages of soft investment environment in Fujian.

关 键 词：闽台 农业科技合作 台湾农业企业 台湾农业管理机构 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F327[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32