先验辩护和自然主义认识论是兼容的吗?  

Is A Priori Justification Compatible with Naturalized Epistemology?

作　　者：喻郭飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南大学人文学院哲学系,昆明650091

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2014年第6期9-15,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：云南大学人文社会科学青年研究基金;项目编号:13YNUHSS058

摘　　要：在当前的知识论讨论中,关于先验辩护、先验知识与自然主义认识论之间的关系问题存在诸多争论。常识性的观点认为先验知识和经验知识之间是一种相互独立、甚至是对立的关系,而许多自然主义认识论的支持者否认存在先验知识,这就给人们留下了"先验辩护和自然主义认识论水火不容"的印象。但是,如果我们详细考察先验辩护本身的特点、并认真分析先验辩护与先验知识之间以及先验辩护和经验辩护之间的关系,就会发现"必然性"、"分析性"和"自明性"这些概念可以从对"先验性"概念的理解中分离出来。进一步地,如果我们将先验辩护和经验辩护的区别主要限定在辩护类型方面的差异,那么先验辩护和自然主义认识论就有可能在一种类似阿尔文·戈德曼(Alvin Goldman)所提供的可靠论框架下相互兼容。In contemporary epistemological discussion, the relationship between a priori justification, a priori knowledge and naturalized epistemology is a hot .issue. It is generally held that there is a dichotomy or independency between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge, and many naturalists even refute the very existence of a priori knowledge altogether, therefore, it seems that a priori justification and naturalized epistemology are in- compatible at all. But if we analyze the very concept of ＂a priori justification＂ carefully, disentangle the ill-motived construal of apriority as something binding together modality, analyticity and intuition, take a priori justification as well as a posterior justification to be different kinds of justificatory resources and evaluate their justificatory power with regard to reliability in truth-conduciveness, then a reliabilist explication of a priori justification within moderate naturalism given by Alvin Goldman offers to us a promising way to rethink about the compatibility between them.

关 键 词：先验知识 先验辩护 自然主义认识论 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]