基于随机指令注入的抗旁路攻击硬件防护技术  

Hardware countermeasure against side-channel attacks based on randomized instruction injection

作　　者：贺章擎[1,2] 敖天勇[1,3] 刘恺[1] 戴葵[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学光学与电子信息学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]湖北工业大学电气与电子工程学院,湖北武汉430068 [3]河南大学物理与电子学院,河南开封475004

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第5期128-132,共5页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60973035;61202481);湖北省自然科学基金资助项目(ZRZ0051)

摘　　要：提出一种基于随机指令注入的抗旁路攻击硬件防护技术,通过在处理器内部嵌入一个指令自动产生与插入模块,在处理器运行过程中实时产生一些随机的指令并随机插入到正常指令执行序列中,打乱正常指令执行时序,起到了随机延迟与功耗混淆的作用,克服了现有软件随机延迟技术存在的缺陷.采用影子寄存器等策略解决随机指令执行与正常指令的冲突问题;通过采用配置寄存器来灵活地对随机指令注入功能进行控制,减少了系统防护开销,提高了防护效率.实验结果表明该技术比现有随机时间延迟技术安全性更强而且开销更低.A randomized instruction injection technique was proposed, and the instruction injection hardware module which could generate random instructions and insert them into the normal instruc- tion streams at any time was integrated into CPU （central processing unit）. The power profile of a cryptographic application will be confused by the module, leading to power analysis attacks becoming very hardly and even impossible. The shadow registers and other strategies were used to resolve the conflict between the execution of normal instructions and random instructions. A configuration regis- ter was used to control the operating modes and reduce the overhead of randomized instruction injection. Experimental results show that the countermeasure proposed has stronger security and lower cost than that of current techniques.

关 键 词：旁路攻击 防护技术 随机延迟 随机指令注入 配置寄存器 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]