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机构地区:[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052
出 处:《商业经济与管理》2014年第6期22-28,共7页Journal of Business Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金重点项目"服务型制造运行机理与运作管理新方法研究"(70932004)
摘 要:售后服务在当前家电市场竞争中扮演着重要的角色,其管理问题一直以来都备受各方关注。作为企业的业务单元,在不同的渠道结构中,家电售后服务既可能成为渠道成员间竞争的业务,也可能成为相互促进收益的业务。因此对家电售后服务的管理问题需要区分竞争性与互补性的情况。文章从生产商角度,针对涉及较少的互补性服务进行研究,通过建立博弈模型,分析了常见的三种售后服务管理模式对生产商的收益的影响,认为生产商集中管理互补性的售后服务,未必始终有利于渠道成员的利益;在一定范围内,由生产商与下游企业合作提供互补性的服务,能够保障双方的收益,实现共赢。After-sale service plays an important part in market competition among house-hold electrical appliance enterprises. The management problem has always been highly focused. As a business part of enterprises, after-sale service of house-hold electri- cal appliance may be competitive business among sellers, or be complementary business in different channel structures. So the com- petitive and complementary situations should be distinguished. In this paper, the less studied complementary service is discussed. Game theory model is established and influence on manufacturers' profit of three common management modes is analyzed. The result shows the centralized management of after-sale service may not be always profitable, and under certain conditions, the mode where complementary after-sale service is carried on both by manufacturer and downstream member would achieve a double-win outcome.
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