先驱者利润与地方公共服务创新逻辑——选择性激励机制的构建  

Promoter's Profit and the Logic of Local Government's Public Service Innovation

作　　者：陈世香[1,2] 谢秋山[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学政治与公共管理学院,武汉430072 [2]武汉大学地方政府公共服务创新研究中心,武汉430072

出　　处：《四川师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期39-44,共6页Journal of Sichuan Normal University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金青年项目"行政价值理论建构及其在中国应用研究"(08CZZ012)

摘　　要：由于缺乏经济利润诱发的竞争刺激,"政治企业家"的选择性激励机制构建对于公共服务创新是相对更为重要的。"先驱者利润"驱动的创新机制有四个关键要素,即创新型企业家、"企业家利润机会"、可供企业家支配资源的存在、以及良好的创新产权保护制度。未来的国家政治机制设计,一要明确政治晋升作为"先驱者利润"的激励机制,以强化竞争刺激;二要调整官员绩效考核标准,加快实现从"经济绩效"到"社会绩效"指标的转移,以实现激励与政治目标的统一;三要通过制度化的中央巡视制度和居民主观评价及时认定已发生的地方政府公共服务创新行为,并将之与地方官员职务晋升相挂钩,以有效保护政治创新产权。Due to the lack of competitive incentive induced by economic profit, constructing a kind of selective incentive mechanism directed to ＂political entrepreneur＂ is essential to public service innova- tion. Innovation mechanism, which was induced by promoter＇s profit, is consist of four t-dements, i.e., the innovative entrepreneur, profit taken opportunity, resources and power available, and property right protection. In the process of national political mechanism design, firstly, the political incentive mecha- nism of official promotions needs to be cotffirmcd as a kind of promoter＇ s profit so as to strengthen com- petition among local officials. Secondly, official pcrformancc assessment system should be improved to acctltrate the prcmess of transition from economic performance to social performance, so as to reach the conformity between stimuhts and political goals. Thirdly, through central govcrnmcnt＇ s inspection system and residents＇ suhjcctivc cvahtation method, existed local government public service innovation behavior should be timely confirmcd, and the innovation behavior with official＇ s promotion should be connected, and property rights of public service innovation can thus ht： protected.

关 键 词：先驱者利润 地方政府 公共服务创新 产权 选择性激励机制 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]