不完全信息竞价模型在无线电频谱配置的应用  

Application of incomplete information bidding model in radio spectrum allocation

作　　者：刘纬华[1] 石文华[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110819 [2]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报》2014年第5期125-128,共4页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371034)

摘　　要：为探索资源产权制度和有偿使用制度的实现机制,以无线电频谱为例,依据一阶密封拍卖原理,通过建立运营商在无线电频谱拍卖过程中的不完全信息竞价模型,分析运营商的投标数量、竞价成功概率等因素对于运营商最优报价的影响以及中标者数量对运营商期望利润函数的影响,并求解模型得出运营商报价的一般表达式.分析表明,将拍卖机制运用于无线电频谱资源分配,既充分体现频谱资源的经济价值,又有利于频谱资源的有效配置,同时是在运营商利润最大化前提下的优化决策.To explore the reasonable mechanisms of resources property rights and the complusory system, taking the radio spectrum as an example and in acorrding to the first order sealed auction principle, this paper establishes an incomplete information bidding model during the radio spectrum auction process to analyze the impacts on operators optimal of factors such as the number of operators bidding, bidding probability of success and so on, and the effects on operators expected profit function of the number of successful bidders, and draw the general expression of operators quote by solving model. Analysis showed that the application of auction mechanism in the radio spectrum resource allocation not only fully reflected the economic value of spectrum resources, but also conducive to the efficient allocation of spectrum resources, and was the ptimizing decisions as well under the premise that the profits of operators was maximized.

关 键 词：资源配置 频谱 拍卖 不完全信息 

分 类 号：TN92[电子电信—通信与信息系统]