国家助学贷款供给困境的经济分析——基于供给层面利益博弈的视角  

Study on the supply predicament of GSSL ——based on the perspective of interest game on the supply level

作　　者：王俊春[1] 黄宇飞[1] 朱志倩[1] 

机构地区：[1]保山学院经济管理学院,云南保山678000

出　　处：《保山学院学报》2014年第2期75-83,共9页JOURNAL OF BAOSHAN UNIVERSITY

摘　　要：对于国家助学贷款供给过程中出现的周期性递减现象,聚焦于供给层面中政府和银行两个利益主体,假设变量、构建完全信息动态博弈模型,通过"政府守信、银行合作","银行不合作、政府不守信"以及"政府守信、银行不合作"三种情形的比较分析,总结模型结论,提出相应建议。For the supply of GSSL shows cyclical government and banks, assuming variables, to build decline phenomenon. Article focused on the the complete information the Dynamic Game Mode, Article analyses three problems which ＂government credits, banks cooperate＂, ＂banks don＇ t cooperate, government doesn＇t commit＂ and ＂government credits, banks don＇t cooperate＂ by model analysis and mathematical derivation, summary of the model conclusions, make recommendations accordingly.

关 键 词：国家助学贷款 供给效率 动态博弈 政策动态非一致性 

分 类 号：G64[文化科学—高等教育学]