银行债权监督与公司内部治理——研究综述  

Bank's Monitoring as Creditors and Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Governance——A Review

作　　者：王满四[1] 任梦[1] 邵国良[1] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学,广州510006

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2014年第6期145-152,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科项目"银行债权治理的公司治理效应及其机制研究:考虑治理机制间的相关性"(项目编号:10YJA7901871);广东省自然科学基金项目"银行监督的公司治理效应;激励与机制研究"(项目编号:S2013010013781);广东省软科学规划重点项目"基于银投合作的广东科技金融产品创新及风险投资发展研究"(项目编号:2012B070300112)

摘　　要：银行债权监督通过内部治理机制发挥公司治理效应。从经理层治理、董事会治理、股东治理3个方面综述银行债权监督与公司内部治理机制间作用关系的文献。综述表明,银行债权通过对企业经营状况的监督来确定贷款政策,通过对自由现金流量的控制对经理层进行监督和激励,但目前我国银行债权的经理层监督效应仍然弱化。大股东治理导致银行债权治理效应弱化,银行债权对"隧道效应"的约束作用具有两面性,银企交叉持股有利有弊,目前学界结论尚未统一。银行背景董事有助于企业获得贷款优惠,但我国银行董事的监督效应弱化。现有文献主要研究银行债权与公司治理各个机制之间的关系,但并未充分研究银行债权如何通过公司内部治理机制的影响从而进一步影响公司价值的作用机理以及效用,也缺乏银行债权治理机制的具体研究。同时,大部分学者仍停留在银行债权与其他治理机制的单一关系研究上,并未从互动角度进行研究。The review is about the interactive effect between bank’s monitoring as creditors and other internal mechanisms corporate governance research from three aspects ： executive governance ,board governance , shareholder governance .The review suggests that the bank determined the lending policies by the supervision of business conditions , supervising and motivating the managers through the control -ling of free cash flow ,the supervision of bank is weak ;largest shareholder governance lead to supervising weakening of Bank’s Monitoring as creditors , binding effect of bank claims on the “tunnel effect” has two sides ,the banks corporate cross - shareholdings pros and cons , some conclusion has not been present in scholarly circles .Banks background director helps businesses get loans ,but our bank directors is weakening .Existing literature mainly studied relationship between the bank debt and the mechanisms of corporate governance .But it did not adequately study how the bank debt affect the value of the company further through the action and effectiveness of internal corporate gov -ernance mechanisms ,but also lacking of specific research on bank claims governance mechanisms .Meanwhile ,most scholars still remains research on the bank debt and other governance mechanisms in a single relationship ,not from the perspective of interaction .

关 键 词：公司治理 银行监督 公司价值 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]