政府监管金融服务外包供应商的策略选择研究——基于进化博弈论的视角  

Research on the Strategic Choice for Government in Supervising of Supplier of Outsourcing in Financial Services——From Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

作　　者：唐柳[1,2] 俞乔[1] 李志铭[3] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院,北京100084 [2]四川大学工程设计研究院,成都610065 [3]中国科学院成都生物研究所,成都610023

出　　处：《软科学》2014年第6期29-34,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：教育部自主科研项目(两岸清华合作基础研究Z02-3)

摘　　要：基于监管方与供应商的行为特征,运用进化博弈论研究了政府有效监管供应商的行为策略。研究结果表明:在金融服务外包业务运营过程中,政府监管机构与供应商之间不存在进化稳定均衡策略,但监管强度、监管成本和处罚力度这几个关键变量能有效影响供应商的风险激励,应据此合理设立政府直接监管供应商的监管标准,有效降低供应商违规行为的期望收益。By researching on strategies of governments＇ supervision using evolutionary game theory based on behavioral char-acteristics of both supervisor and suppliers, this paper theoretical foundation for institutional building of direct governmental su-pervision to suppliers. It indicates that that the stable equilibrium strategy does not exist between governmental supervisor andsupplier during procedure of financial services outsourcing, but the key variables such as the cost and the intensity of supervision and punishment are able to influence effectively on suppliers＇ sensitivity of risk. Therefore, it suggests supervising institu-tions establish legitimate standard for the outsourcing and lower the expected return of illegal behaviors of suppliers.

关 键 词：金融服务外包 政府监管 供应商 进化博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F224.32