半强制分红政策与中国上市公司分红行为  

The Semi-mandatory Dividend Rules and Dividend Behaviors of Chinese Listed Firms

作　　者：魏志华[1] 李茂良[2] 李常青[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院 [2]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2014年第6期100-114,共15页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102058;71102059;71172050;71372072);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2011221012;2010221028)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文实证检验了中国独特的半强制分红政策对上市公司分红行为的影响,研究发现:(1)半强制分红政策及其各个阶段都显著提高了中国资本市场的派现意愿和派现水平,但相比而言,明确了最低分红"门槛"的2006年和2008年政策反而比2001年和2004年的引导性政策具有更弱的约束效应。(2)半强制分红政策的监管压力推动非竞争性行业、高盈利的公司提高了派现水平,但其规定的再融资资格也迫使那些高成长、有再融资需求的公司不得不进行派现。(3)半强制分红政策难以约束"铁公鸡"公司派现,也没有降低"铁公鸡"公司占比。(4)2006年和2008年政策实施后,发放"门槛"股利和"微股利"的公司明显增加,原因在于偏低的分红"门槛"对高派现公司产生了明显的"负向激励"。总体而言,半强制分红政策对于改善上市公司分红状况卓有成效,但其局限性亦不容忽视。This paper empirically tests on the effects of Semi-mandatory Dividend Rules （hereinafter referred to as ＂the Rules＂）on Chinese listed firms＇ dividend behaviors. We show that （1）the Rules in general and their various stages significantly enhanced the propensity and magnitude of dividend payments of Chinese listed firms, although the 2006 and 2008 Rules which specified the ＂threshold dividend＂ have weaker effects on dividend payments than the 2001 and 2004 guiding Rules. （2） The Rules＇ regulatory pressure has promoted firms in non-competitive industries and with high profitability to increase dividend payouts, and also forced those firms with high growth opportunities and financing demand to pay dividends. （3）The Rules have neither forced those ＂stingy＂ firms to pay dividends, nor reduced the proportion of ＂stingy＂ firms. （4）Firms paying ＂ threshold dividend＂ and ＂micro dividend＂ have increased significantly after the 2006 and 2008 Rules, the reason may be that the low level ＂ threshold＂ triggered ＂ negative incentive＂ for those high cash dividend payout companies. Overall, the Rules have significantly improved the dividend status of Chinese listed firms, but they also have distinctive limitations.

关 键 词：半强制分红政策 股利政策 负向激励 监管悖论 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.6