晋升激励、土地财政与经济增长绩效——基于中部六省的面板数据  

Promotion Incentives,Land Finance and Performance of Economic Growth

作　　者：李勇刚[1,2] 张士杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学经济学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]南京大学经济学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济经纬》2014年第4期116-121,共6页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD025);国家社会科学基金一般项目(10BJY094);国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CJL071);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC790086);安徽高校省级人文社会科学研究一般项目(SK2013B017);安徽财经大学校级一般项目(ACKYQ1116)

摘　　要：笔者依据1978年～2011年中部六省面板数据分析了晋升激励对中国经济增长绩效的影响。研究发现，地方官员的晋升激励促进了经济增长，但不利于经济增长绩效的提高；晋升激励与土地财政之间存在正向的互动关系；土地财政降低了经济增长绩效，而官员晋升激励通过土地财政的传导作用，抑制了经济增长绩效的提高。这表明晋升激励和土地财政是近年中国粗放型经济增长的一个重要根源。This paper investigates the effect of promotion incentives on the performance of economic growth in China by using the panel data of Chinese 31 provinces from 1999 to 2010. The results show, promotion incentive of local officials promotes economic growth, but is not conducive to improve the performance of economic growth. Further, the promotion incentives, land finance and the performance of economic growth bring into the same economic system, the research found, there is a positive interactions between promotion incen- tives and land finance. And the land finance reduces performance of economic growth. Promotion incentive of official and the increase of land finance have improved the performance of economic growth. The results show that the promotion incentive and land finance are the important sources of the inefficient economic growth in China in recent years.

关 键 词：晋升激励 土地财政 经济增长绩效 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]