转轨时期的政府干预、银行行为及其经营绩效——基于我国城市商业银行的分析  

Government Interventions, Behaviors and Performances of Banks during the Transitional Period: Evidences from China's City Commercial Banks

作　　者：王擎[1] 潘李剑 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 [2]广州证券有限责任公司

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2014年第6期40-56,共17页Financial Regulation Research

基　　金：西南财经大学"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"创新团队建设项目(JBK130401);金融安全协同创新中心专项项目(JRXT201309)资助

摘　　要：在我国推进改革的转轨时期,资源配置以租金机制为主、价格机制为辅,地方政府对城市商业银行经营管理的干预是一种必然。本文构建了一个寻租理论框架来分析这一问题。理论分析表明,面对地方政府的干预,我国城市商业银行寻租动机较强,寻租行为和生产行为形成一种特殊的互补关系。同时,本文基于2006—2011年期间的城市商业银行样本数据进行了实证检验。检验结果表明,政府干预会导致城市商业银行形成较高的不良贷款率,一定范围内的政府干预虽然不会对银行的资产收益率产生显著影响,但干预程度较大时还是会对银行的资产收益率产生负面影响。本文的研究对我国改善地方政府与城市商业银行的关系,促进城市商业银行的良性发展不乏启示意义。During the transition period of deepening reforms, the asset allocations are firstly based on the rent- seeking mechanism, and secondly based on the price mechanism. It is natural that local governments intervene in the operations of city commercial banks. We construct a rent-seeking theoretical framework to analyze the issue, Theoretical analysis shows that the city commercial banks have strong rent-seeking motivations, and rent-seeking behaviors and operation behaviors are complementary in this situation. Based on samples of city commercial banks from 2006 to 2011, this paper finds that government interventions caused higher ratio of nonperforming loans. Government interventions do not have significant impact on ROA, while a greater degree of interventions would have a negative effect on the bank＇s ROA. This research is helpful to improve the relationship between local governments and city commercial banks, and to promote the sustainable develonment of city c.ornrn^rri^l h.nlc

关 键 词：经济转轨 政府干预 城市商业银行 寻租 经营绩效 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]