Power Pool中发电公司的竞价策略  

BIDDING STRATEGIESOF GENERATION COMPANIESIN POWER POOL

作　　者：李灿[1] 龚乐年[1] 宋燕敏[2] 曹荣章[2] 朱为民[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学电气工程系,南京210096 [2]国家电力公司电力自动化研究院,南京210003

出　　处：《电力系统自动化》2001年第6期12-15,共4页Automation of Electric Power Systems

摘　　要：研究了电力联营体 (Power Pool)中发电公司的报价策略。在非完全竞争的 Power Pool中 ,发电公司可以作为一个价格接受者 ,也可利用其市场势力操纵市场价格。发电公司作为价格接受者时将基于边际成本曲线报价 ,但其最低报价必须根据市场行情而变化 ;具有市场势力的发电公司可以采取限制产量、抬高电价的策略。 Power Pool中市场势力的存在不利于资源的优化配置和利用。This paper studies the bidding strategies of generation companies in Power Pool. In an imperfect competition Power Pool, some generation companies (GenComs) may have market power. A GenCom can bid as a price acceptor or as a price changer. A price acceptor will bid according to its marginal cost curve, but the minimum bid price must be decided by dynamic programming based on price forecasting. A price changer will bid according to the strategy of restricting output and forcing up price. The Power Pool will be inefficient when market power of GenComs are strong.

关 键 词：电力市场 竞价策略 电力工业 电力联营体 发电公司 中国 

分 类 号：F426.6[经济管理—产业经济]