基于演化博弈的集体林权流转市场初级阶段的理论探索  

Exploration of Primary Stage of Collective Forest Right Transfer Market Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：吕铎[1] 罗兰[2] 赵春荣[3] 

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学城市与环境学院,昆明650221 [2]云南财经大学商学院,昆明650221 [3]云南财经大学会计学院,昆明650221

出　　处：《林业经济问题》2014年第1期43-49,共7页Issues of Forestry Economics

基　　金：云南省教育厅科学研究基金资助项目(2012J036)

摘　　要：运用演化博弈方法对集体林权流转过程中各利益相关方的博弈关系进行分析的结果表明:林业中间人运作成本、林农的法律意识以及来自政府的监管等因素直接影响林业中间人与林权资产评估机构诚信行为的选择,进而决定集体林权流转市场形态在初级阶段的演化方向。基于此,提出严控林业公职人员市场禁入、优化林权评估委托制度及林区普法工作、构建林权社会化服务平台等政策建议。Analysis of game relationship by applying evolutionary game theory on all interest parties in the process of collective forest right transfer indicate： The evolutionary path of the collective forest right transfer market changes, because that factors, such as operating cost of forestry intermediator, the legal consciousness of forestry farmers and the government＇s supervision, affect mutual behavioral choices between forestry intermediator and asset evaluation institute. Advices based on the exploration are banning the forestry officials from entering the collective forest right transfer market, optimizing forest right evaluation system and the legal work in forest district, constructing socialized service＇platforms of forest rights.

关 键 词：集体林权流转 演化博弈 中间人 资产评估 林权流转政策 

分 类 号：F307.21[经济管理—产业经济]