动力电池回收的环境质量成本控制模型构建  

Environmental Quality Cost Control Modeling Based on Power Battery Recycling

作　　者：尤建新[1] 段春艳[1] 黄志明 钟之阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]上海挚达科技发展有限公司,上海200433

出　　处：《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第6期969-975,共7页Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science

基　　金：上海市优秀学术带头人计划(11XD1405100);上海市战略性新兴产业重点项目(第二批沪经信技(2013)152号);上海市信息化发展专项资金项目(1374648649906)

摘　　要：针对新能源汽车普及化后将存在大量废弃动力电池对环境造成污染,提出废弃动力电池回收处理过程中的环境质量成本控制问题,运用委托代理理论和博弈分析,分别构建对称信息条件下废弃动力电池回收的环境质量成本控制模型,以及非对称信息条件下废弃动力电池回收商的单边道德风险环境质量成本控制模型和政府的单边道德风险环境质量检测成本控制模型,并运用Matlab对数值算例进行计算和分析.研究结果表明:在对称信息条件下,存在回收商和政府期望收益同时最优的环境质量成本预防水平和环境质量检测水平;在非对称信息情况下,无论回收商还是政府存在单边道德风险时,回收商在环境质量成本控制过程中,始终处于负收益状态,整个逆向供应链的联合期望收益也始终处于负收益状态.Based on agent theories and game theories,we built an environmental quality cost control model of waste battery under symmetric information,unilateral moral risk environmental quality control model of waste battery recyclers under asymmetric information,and government unilateral moral risk environmental quality test cost control model separately.Moreover,we calculated and analyzed the data with Matlab.The results show that under symmetric information,there is common optimal environmental quality cost prevention level and environmental quality test level for both government and recyclers; with asymmetric information,no matter when the government or recyclers exists unilateral moral risk,recyclers have always been in negative income status during environmental quality control process,and so to the joint average income of the entire reverse supply chain.

关 键 词：环境质量成本 博弈论 委托代理关系 动力电池回收 

分 类 号：F253.3[经济管理—国民经济]