中国环境污染保险供需“双冷”的经济解释  

The Economic Interpretation on the Lack of Interest in China's Environmental Pollution Insurance on both the Supply and Demand Sides

作　　者：张伟[1] 粟榆[1] 罗向明[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院保险研究所,广东广州510521

出　　处：《保险研究》2014年第5期3-12,共10页Insurance Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金项目"中国农业保险环境效应测度及补贴政策调控研究"(编号:71203038);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"基于农村环境保护视角的农业保险绿色补贴机制研究"(编号:13YJA630062);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"城市化进程中农民工职业病风险演化路径及综合保险补偿机制研究"(编号:12YJA840004)资助

摘　　要：环境污染保险的需求来自于排污企业转嫁损失风险的需要,而企业的潜在损失风险又取决于政府的环境规制力度。如果政府颁布的环保法规对非法排污行为的处罚不严,并且环境执法过于宽松,则在发生环境污染事故时企业面临的罚款和赔偿较少,无须通过购买保险来转嫁损失风险,从而导致环境污染保险需求不足。在规模经济效应的制约下,需求的疲软又会造成供给缺乏弹性,最终造成环境污染保险出现供需"双冷"的局面。政府应该从加强环境规制力度入手,通过经济激励的方式来启动企业对环境污染保险的市场需求,进而提升保险公司的供给意愿,而不应实施政策性保险的发展模式。The demand for environmental pollution insurance comes from pollution-emission companies＇ needs to shift the risk of loss, and their magnitude of risks and potential losses depends on the government＇ s environmental supervision intensity. If the regulation for illegal emission isn＇ t stringent and enforcement is lax, the fines and com- pensation for damages paid by polluters wouldn＇ t be heavy enough to necessiate mitigation by insurance, resulting in shortage of demands for environmental pollution insurance. Under the constraint of economy of scale, weak demand would lead to inelastic supply, eventually causing low interest in environmental pollution insurance on both sides of supply and demand. Government should start from strengthening environmental regulation efforts, then economically stimulate the demands for environmental pollution insurance market, and thus enhance the supply by insurance com- panies, rather than adopt the policy-sponsored development model.

关 键 词：环境污染保险 环境规制 供给弹性 累积性环境污染 

分 类 号：F842.3[经济管理—保险]