通胀预期与货币政策的优化操作  

Inflation expectations and Operation optimization of monetary policy

作　　者：贺根庆[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学博士后流动站,100101 [2]包商银行博士后工作站,100101

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2014年第5期20-26,共7页Shanghai Journal of Economics

摘　　要：本文通过对Kydland-Prescott方程的改进,结合我国实际,构造适合我国国情的货币政策博弈模型,对不同信息结构下中央银行和经济主体间的动态博弈过程进行具体分析。在此基础上,就货币政策的优化分析了我国实施通胀目标制的可行性。研究发现:稳定的通胀预期可以提高货币政策的有效性,降低货币政策的实施成本;其次中央银行采用机会主义获得的短期效用不能持久,反而导致通胀预期的不稳定,对经济的危害更大。最后,本文对货币政策的优化操作提出了相关的政策建议。Through the improvement of the Kydland-Prescott equation, we construct the game model of monetary policy to suitable for China＇s national conditions. And we analysis the dynamic game process between the central bank and the economic subject. On this basis, it analyzes the feasibility of monetary policy implementation of inflation targeting in china. The results show： The stable inflation expectations can improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and reduce the cost of monetary policy implementation; The central banks＇ short-term utility not only can not obtain lasting by using opportunism, but also lead to disstable of inflation expectations and the greater harm to the economy. Finally, we put forward relevant policy recommendations for the optimal operation of monetary policy.

关 键 词：货币政策 动态博弈 通胀预期 通胀目标制 

分 类 号：F820.5[经济管理—财政学]