银行民营化的前因溯源——一个新的解释  

A New Interpretation about the Reason of Bank Privatization

作　　者：邵传林[1] 陈增贤[2] 

机构地区：[1]兰州商学院金融学院 [2]兰州商学院经济学院

出　　处：《社会科学》2014年第7期43-52,共10页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：甘肃省高等学校科研项目"甘肃临夏少数民族地区非正规金融的生成逻辑治理机制及其风险防范研究"(项目编号:2013A-073)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：不论从产权制度的效率还是从银行家才能的特殊性来看,在中小银行创办初期,都应允许银行家拥有银行的产权。由于声誉机制的作用,由银行家私人拥有的银行并不会引发机会主义行为,进而对整个金融系统产生负的外部性冲击。但中国当前金融过度管制政策破坏了声誉机制发生作用的条件,并引发了一系列的扭曲效应,既阻碍了银行家才能有效发挥,还强化了利益相关者的机会主义行为倾向,最终致使低效率二元化金融制度结构长期延存。于是,变革当前不合理的金融管制政策便具有效率意义上的正当性。Bankers should be allowed to have ownership of banks in the early of small banks founded, from the efficiency of property rights or the special nature of bankers＇ capacity. Private banks would not lead to opportunistic behavior because of reputation mechanism, without the impact of negative externalities on the entire financial system. But the current financial policy played a role in undermining reputation mechanism in China, triggered a series of distorting effects, impeded the effective functioning of bankers＇ capacity, and strengthened the opportunistic behavior tendencies of stakeholders, which ultimately resulted in low efficiency of the dual financial institution. So changing the current unreasonable financial policy will be efficient sense of legitimacy.

关 键 词：银行民营化 声誉机制 过度管制 企业理论 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]