金融集聚区建设中中央与地方政府行为的演化博弈研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game between Central Government and Local Government in Financial Industry Gathering Area Construction

作　　者：任碧云[1] 罗安邦[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学金融与保险研究中心,天津300222

出　　处：《经济问题》2014年第7期36-40,共5页On Economic Problems

基　　金：2014年天津市教委社会科学重大项目"滨海新区制度创新与金融业先行先试研究"(2014ZD09)中期研究成果

摘　　要：在金融集聚区建设中,中央政府行为与地方政府行为表现出行为生态学特征。构建演化博弈模型分析了中央政府和地方政府之间的博弈,显示双方期望收益、中央政府出台政策的力度、地方政府在中央政府不支持情况下建设金融集聚区遭受的损失程度及双方初始博弈策略选择状态决定了演化稳定均衡策略。基于此,提出了因地制宜改变博弈参数、提高地方政府对正向激励和行政惩罚措施的敏感度、构建更加合理的政绩考核体系等建议。In financial industry gathering area construction, central government behavior and local government behavior exhibit behavioral ecology characteristics. The article analyzes gambling relations between central govern- ment and local government by building the model of the evolutionary game theory. The results show that the evolu- tionarily stable equilibrium between central government behavior and local government behavior is determined by the expected return of the two sides, the intensity of the central government policies, the extent of the loss suffered by the local government in the case of no support of central government and the initial state of the strategies selected by the players. Based on the above conclusions, the article makes the following suggestions that changing game parameters pertinently, improving local goverument＇s sensitivity to positive incentives and administrative punitive measures, improving local government performance evaluation mechanism.

关 键 词：金融聚集区 中央政府 地方政府 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]