内部控制政府监管、审计介入与会计信息相关性  

Internal Control Regulation、Audit Intervened and Accounting Relevance

作　　者：赵兴楣[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学会计学院,广东广州510320 [2]中南财经政法大学工商管理博士后流动站,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《经济问题》2014年第7期101-107,共7页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"契约安排;政府监管与审计者独立性"(09CJY087);广东省自然科学基金项目"上市公司内部控制评价研究"(10151032001000008);国家自然科学基金项目"经济责任审计创新及其信号传递效应研究"(71172224)

摘　　要：应用混合线性估价模型分析内部控制政府监管和审计介入对信息相关、进而对市场估价的影响,并揭示监管成本对投资者预期和估价的影响方式。研究发现:内部控制的政府监管增强了信息相关,但是监管效应会在后续年度随着期望的回落而回调;监管净收益大于未监管收益,带来了股价的正向反应,但是优势不明显;以审计介入在报告终点的监管存在双重影响,一方面,它因增信作用提高了信息相关,另一方面,强制审计会对投资者造成负面影响,引起股价的负向反应。Using Mixed model and data of 61 enterprises listed in domestic as well as overseas, which are known as regulated firms because their internal control system supervised by government, this study empirically analysis regulation cost and mandatory audit＇ s influence on accounting relevance. The result shows that Internal control regulation breaks the participation constraint and provides an information discrimination which enhances the investors＇ accounting confidence and improves the relevance. Firm value rises because the more regulated income which also leads to the price＇s positive reaction. Audit has dual influences： it improves the relevance for confidence enhance with implicit incentive and gives rise to the price falling.

关 键 词：内部控制 政府监管 审计介入 激励约束 信息相关 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]