信息环境、机会主义动机与不可验证性会计估计——来自长期资产减值准备的经验证据  

Information Environment,Opportunistic Motivation and Unverifiable Accounting Estimates: Empirical Evidence from Long-term Asset Impairment

作　　者：陈骏[1] 徐玉德[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院国际商学院,南京210029 [2]财政部财政科学研究所,北京100142

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2014年第7期55-64,共10页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"政策性负担;盈余管理及其经济后果"(批准号71202172);江苏省"青蓝工程"优秀骨干教师(批准号苏教师[2012]39号)

摘　　要：已有研究表明不可验证性会计估计易受经理人机会主义动机的操控,从而降低会计信息决策的有用性。笔者以长期资产减值准备为研究对象,实证检验了信息环境对经理人操控不可验证性会计估计的机会主义动机的约束效应。研究发现,通过变更会计准则约束经理人管理盈余的机会主义动机,改善不可验证性会计估计质量的效果并不显著;信息环境对经理人的机会主义动机具有约束效应,当信息环境越透明,公司的长期资产减值会计估计质量越高;进一步的研究发现,信息环境的约束效应主要存在于"大清洗"动机的公司之中。笔者的研究拓展了会计信息决策有用性的研究视角,为提高会计准则实施效果提供了经验证据的支持。Past research have shown that unverifiable accounting estimates is vulnerable to manipulate by manager, which would reduce the usefulness of decision-making for accounting information. This paper exam the effect of information environment on management opportunist motivation and unverifiable accounting estimates from the perspective of long-term assets impairment. In this paper, we take the data of analysts＇ forecasts, the information disclosure index and institutional ownership as proxy variables of the information environment. This result shows that the estimates of asset impairment are affected by the opportunistic motivation of managers significantly; the better information environment of company, the higher the quality of asset impairment estimates; the constraint effect of information e＇nvironment on management opportunistic motivation mainly reflect in the presence of ＂ Big Bath＂ company. This study extends the perspective of fair-value research, and provides empirical evidence to support the implementing effect of accounting standards.

关 键 词：信息环境 机会主义动机 不可验证性会计估计 长期资产减值 

分 类 号：F231[经济管理—会计学]