财政分权、亲贫式支出与减贫的关系研究  

Fiscal Decentralization, Pro-poor Spending and Poverty Reduction

作　　者：刘力华[1] 周虎 侯圣清[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院,北京100872 [2]中国农民体育协会,北京100125

出　　处：《农学学报》2014年第6期112-115,124,共5页Journal of Agriculture

摘　　要：应用22个省份、自治区、直辖市的面板数据,分析财政分权、亲贫式支出与减贫的关系。研究得出财政分权不利于减贫,在中国的政治体制环境下,财政分权会导致地方政府为了追求经济增长而增加基础建设类生产性投资,相对减少有利于减贫的服务性公共投资,也即亲贫式支出。亲贫式支出与财政集中结合起来对减贫的作用才能更加明显,如果财政分权程度高,亲贫式支出虽然绝对值增加,但是相对值仍下降,会进一步增加贫富差距,不利于社会公平与减贫。财政分权程度对于亲贫式支出减贫的作用存在一个临界值,财政分权程度小于该值,亲贫式支出减贫作用明显;财政分权程度超过该值,亲贫式支出不利于减贫。In this paper, 22 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the panel data analyzed the relationship between fiscal decentralization, pro-poor spending and poverty reduction. We got a result that fiscal decentralization was not conducive to poverty reduction results because in the Chinese political system environment, fiscal decentralization would lead to local governments in pursuit of economic growth and increased investment in productive infrastructure category, that was discussed in this paper pro- poor expenditures. Pro-poor expenditures combined with centralized financial impact on poverty can be more obvious, because if a high degree of fiscal decentralization, although the absolute value of the pro-poor expenditures increased, it would still down in relative value. It further increased the gap between rich and poor and was not conducive to social equity and poverty reduction.

关 键 词：财政分权 亲贫式支出 贫困减少 

分 类 号：F328[经济管理—产业经济]