相对破产立法模式——一个新概念的提出  

The Legislative Mode of Relative Bankrupt:A Concept Newly Put Forth

作　　者：张怡[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学法学系,四川成都610071

出　　处：《现代法学》2001年第1期117-120,共4页Modern Law Science

摘　　要：鉴于传统破产法律理论及制度在我国的实践中暴露出来的局限性、封闭性及非效率性等深层次缺陷 ,亟需研究创建一种全新的相对破产立法模式 ,即在法院受理破产申请后于破产宣告前 ,将破产企业整体视为法律拟制的债权人的破产财产 ,由兼并人与债权人依照市场规则进行交易的模式。这种将兼并楔入破产程序的制度设计 ,其特殊功效在于 :将破产企业的债拟制成为可操作的搏奕状态 ,这既可使制度系统功能开放以及市场主体地位回归 ,又可提升破产内在利益驱动机制 ,还可从理论上解决债的一般价值与特殊形态的互补与转换等问题。In view of the limitation, closeness and obvious inefficiency of the traditional legislative theory and system of the bankrupt act exposed in the practice, it is urgent to establish a new type of legislative mode of relative bankrupt. That is, after accepting bankrupt application before declaring by court, bankrupt enterprise as a whole being regarded as the bankrupt property of the fictitious creditors of law, the property will be done a deal by those merging the enterprises and creditors according to the market rule. The special function of the plan on wedging the annexation into the bankrupt system lies in: making the debts of the bankrupt enterprises become a legal fictitious debts that can be operated, which can not only open the function of the system and recover the status of the market subject, but also can promote the mechanism of interests existing in the bankrupt enterprises. In spite of that, it can solve some problems of complementary and shifting of the general value and special form of debts.

关 键 词：中国 相对破产 市场搏奕状态 破产立法模式 利益驱动机值 债权人 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]