金融监管效率机制的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Financial Supervision

作　　者：董秋仙[1] 喻德坚[1] 

机构地区：[1]南昌大学,江西南昌330047

出　　处：《江西教育学院学报》2000年第6期75-77,共3页Journal of Jiangxi Institute of Education

摘　　要：通过两金融机构之间的静态博弈模型，分析了金融监管的效率机制，得出了以下结论：在设立金融监管机制时最关键的是金融主管部门要制定对无视金融监管的金融机构的惩罚措施，也就是制定惩罚因子θ，在θ确定的条件下接受监管是金融机构的最终选择。Efficient mechanism of financial supervision system is analyzed throuqh the use of a model of static game between two financial organizations.The conclccsion is drawn that the government design and establish an efficient mechanism of financial supervision to render publishment to those who reject it,which is the essential point to the system;thus,throuqh a punishment factorθ ,financial organizations will fiually accept the aupervision.

关 键 词：金融监管 静态博弈 效率机制 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]