占座现象的演化博弈分析——兼论均衡演进与制度变迁  

Evolutionary analysis of occupation phenomenon——equilibrium shift and institutional change

作　　者：华立[1] 赵纯均[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2001年第4期248-252,共5页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

摘　　要：该文旨在对普遍存在的占座现象进行分析 ,揭示均衡不断演进和制度变迁之间的内在联系。通过建立占座行为的博弈模型 ,首次从演化适应的角度系统探讨了均衡的形成、迁移和稳定的过程。分析表明 ,占座制度的形成和发展在资源稀缺的现实中有一定的必然性 ;强行取缔类似的非正规制度 ,监督者需付出高昂的监督成本。模型可用于解释制度变迁、国际经济学、金融投资等领域的一系列问题 ;Occupation phenomenon was studied to determine the internal relationship between equilibrium shift and institutional change. A two stage game model was built to describe the whole adapting process of the occupation behavior in real life. Evolutionary analysis technologies were used to analyze the shift and stability of the Nash equilibria of the model. The process of equilibrium selection was illustrated vividly, which shows that the formation of the institutions of occupation was reasonable and inevitable in resource shortage society. The authorities have to pay a high supervision cost to control the changes without other measures. The model also can be used to explain several other problems, such as institutional changes, and similar phenomena in international economics and finance, which helps us to understand the world better.

关 键 词：占座现象 演化博弈 制度变迁 演化稳定 均衡演进 占座行为 演化适应 资源稀缺 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]