信息不对称:股票市场内幕交易规制优化实施  

Information Asymetry: Optimal Enforcement of Stock Market insider Trading Regulation

作　　者：夏俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2001年第2期16-21,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：内幕交易导致股票市场资源配置效率降低 ,对其进行规制可以减小造市者的逆向选择问题。实施内幕交易规制涉及到规制成本 ,优化实施就是要在规制收益与实施成本间进行权衡 ,谋取最优实施方案。本文探讨在规制者目标为以调整资产组合为目的而交易的不知情投资者期望效用最大化的情况下 ,实施政策的优化组合问题。Insider trading leads to low efficiency of resources allocation in stock market, and insider trading regulation can lessen market maker's adverse selection problem. Enforcement of insider trading regulation involves regulation cost, thereby optimal enforcement is to make a trade-off between regulation revenue and cost. This paper tries to explore the optimization problem of enforcement policy under the assumption that the regulator's goal is to maximize the expected utility of uninformed investors who trade because of portfolio consideration.

关 键 词：股票市场 内幕交易规制 优化实施 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]