产权、家庭效率与家族非效率——农业社会中家庭经济行为分析  

Property Rights, Family Efficiency and Clan Non-efficiency :A treatise on the family economic behavior in rural China

作　　者：潘必胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏省社会科学院现代化中心

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2001年第4期27-35,共9页China Rural Survey

基　　金：国家社科基金资助

摘　　要：产权对于区分家庭和家族至关重要 ,它决定二者的理性化程度和效率水平。家庭作　　为一个产权共同体 ,可以把内部成员的外部收益内部化 ,并决定家庭行为的理性和效率 ;　　家族作为多个产权单位的集合 ,而非单一产权主体 ,其行为具有较低的理性和效率。在一　　个政府界定和实施产权功能较弱的社会中 ,家族相对有效率 ,但它具有扩大共同产权的倾　　向 ,为机会主义提供条件 ,导致无效率和低效率。家族化与市场化是相反的历史过程。产　　权在家族内经常性的无偿转移 ,是导致家族无效的主要原因和表现。归根到底 ,家庭和家　　族的行为是否有效率 ,是严格地受产权共同体范围限制的。Property rights are crucial keys to differentiate between family and clan. Property rights decide the degrees of rationality and efficiency. As a property rights community, a family can internalize the externality, and produce the rationality and efficiency. Then, as a collectivity of multi-unit of property rights, not a unitary property rights body, a clan has lower rationality and efficiency. In a society which government has bad function in claim and carry out property rights, a clan has efficiency relatively, but it will extent the common property rights, and cause lower efficiency. The process to clan economy is contrary to market economy. The main reason and expression is that property rights are transferred free inside clan. In the final analysis, the efficiency of family or of clan is determined by the limit of community of property rights.

关 键 词：农业社会 家庭经济行为 家族 产权 

分 类 号：F063.4[经济管理—政治经济学]