借贷过程信号传递博奕模型分析  

Analyzing the Signaling Game Model in the Credit Process

作　　者：程鹏[1] 吴冲锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程理论方法应用》2001年第2期113-115,120,共4页Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications

摘　　要：本文建立了借贷过程信号传递博奕模型 ,从微观上考查贷款人和借款人之间的关系 ,并求解出该博奕两类均衡 (分离均衡和混同均衡 )的条件。最后指出 ,银行为了降低其承担的信用风险 ,应使博奕出现分离均衡 ,而不要出现混同均衡 ,并给出一些政策建议。This paper establishes a signaling game model in the credit process, and investigates the relationship between creditor and debtor from the microcosmic aspect. The condition of two kinds of game equilibrium (separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium) is solved. At last, the paper points out that the bank will take the lower credit risk when separating equilibrium appears and take the higher credit risk when pooling equilibrium appears, and some policy suggestions are given.

关 键 词：信用风险 信号传递 分离均衡 混同均衡 博弈模型 信贷过程 不对称信息理论 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]