论股权结构、控制权激励与公司绩效  

Structure of the Equity Capital, Prompting by the Right of Control and the Company Performance

作　　者：俞仁龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]嘉兴学院,浙江嘉兴314001

出　　处：《嘉兴学院学报》2001年第4期28-32,103,共6页Journal of Jiaxing University

基　　金：浙江省 2 0 0 0年哲学社会科学规划课题<浙江国有企业法人治理结构与其效率研究> (代码 :M95 D16 )

摘　　要：该文通过对 2 0 0 0年中期 ROE(净资产收益率 )大于 10 %与 ROE为负值的两类上市公司股权结构的实证分析 ,得出了绩效较好的公司国有股比例相对偏低而绩效较差的公司则国有股比例相对偏高的结论。并指出造成这种结果的主要原因是由于国有企业控制权激励机制失灵导致的公司治理结构的缺陷 ,在这种情形下 ,仅仅靠提高国有企业经营者的货币收益 ,并不能达到预期的激励目标。By analyzing the structures of the equity capital in two kinds of companies that have come into the market-companies that have more than 10% of ROE and companies that have a negative value in the middle of 2000 year, this paper draws a conclusion that the state owned stock takes up a comparatively low proportion in the companies that perform well but a higher proportion in those that perform not so well. The paper holds that the main reason for this is the limitation of the running organization, which results from the malfunction of the prompting mechanism in the state owned enterprises. Under such a situation, only by raising the monetary proceeds of proprietors cannot reach the expected goal of the prompting.

关 键 词：股权结构 控制权 激励 公司绩效 ROE 净资产收益率 治理结构 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.6