防洪基金博弈研究  

Study on Game of Flood Control Fund

作　　者：赵勇[1] 孙永广[1] 吴宗鑫[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学核能技术设计研究院,北京100084

出　　处：《水利水电技术》2001年第11期55-58,共4页Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering

摘　　要：应用博弈论对防洪基金机制进行了研究,防洪基金在中国是对中央政府防洪投入的一个重要补充.在对目前的防洪减灾投入体制阐述的基础上,我们建立了博弈模型,用来模拟中央政府和地方政府之间的相互影响和相互作用,此二者被认为是防洪减灾的两大主要参与者.然后,对上述博弈进行了全面的均衡分析,分不同情况讨论了博弈均衡的存在和均衡结果的性质,从而阐明了允许和支持防洪基金出现的条件.实证分析表明,我们的理论分析结果和我国防洪基金的实际情况是十分吻合的.The mechanism of flood control fund,which appears to be an important supplement to flood control input from China Government ,is studied by using the game theory.On the basis of an overview of the current investment system of flood control,a game model is set up to simulate the interactions between the central government and local government s,which are considered to be the major participants in the game of flood control in China.The compre-hensive analyses on the equilibrium of the game defined above are conducted in order to identify the conditions to al-low and support the occurrence of flood control fund.Compatibility is found between the results of theoretical analyses and the reality in China after a comparison is made.

关 键 词：防洪基金 博弈 模型 机制 均衡分析 防洪减灾 

分 类 号：TV877[水利工程—水利水电工程]