腐败、腐败治理与资本外逃关系的博弈分析  

The Relationship Among Corruption、Punishment Scheme and Capital Flight:A Dynamic Game Analysis

作　　者：杨海珍[1] 陈金贤[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院研究生院管理学院,北京100039 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2002年第1期1-4,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 1730 13)

摘　　要：本文建立了一个多节点信息集的不完美动态博弈模型 ,分析了国内合法资本拥有者与非法资本拥有者在政府治理腐败不同力度下的均衡投资策略。分析结果表明 ,在资本市场开放与财政支出刚性条件下 ,当因腐败而使非法资本积累达到一定程度时 ,对腐败进行严厉打击会引致国内非法资本连同合法资本的资本外逃均衡 ,最后 ,提出了抑制资本外逃的政策启示。The paper analyses the equilibrium strategy under different corruption situation and punishment scheme through the establishment of a dynamic game model. The results indicate that the equilibrium investment strategy of domestic legal capital and illegal capital owners would be flight equilibrium under the condition of open capital market and fiscal expenditure rigidity,when the government strictly punish the corruption and the domestic illegal capital is huge enough. In the end the paper presents some policy implications of restraining capital flight from China.

关 键 词：资本外逃 腐败治理 不完善动态博弈模型 均衡投资策略 国际经济学 资本积累 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学] F224.32