国有企业高层管理人员职业生涯预期与企业风险关系研究  

The Career Expectations of Senior Managers and the Risks of State Owned Enterprises

作　　者：盛明泉[1] 汪顺[1,2] 鲍群 SHENG Mingquan;WANG Shun;BAO Qun(Anhui University of Finance ,and Economics, Bengbu, Anhui, China;Jinan University, Guangzhou, China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院 [2]暨南大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2018年第11期1647-1654,共8页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助重点项目(18AJY014)

摘　　要：以国有产权A股上市公司为研究样本,分析并检验了国有企业高层管理人员职业生涯预期与企业风险之间的关系。研究结果表明,较高的职业生涯预期能够降低国有企业的风险水平;随后的路径研究发现,职业生涯预期、以投资效率为代表的代理效率和企业风险之间存在着部分中介的关系;但在代理效率这一路径之外,借鉴外生"反腐败"事件进一步证实了代理成本路径的存在,亦即高层管理人员职业生涯预期能够通过降低在职消费的代理成本属性降低企业风险。此外,研究结果还表明,显性的现金薪酬激励与职业生涯预期二者的激励效果存在着双向替代效应,这也为国有企业制定"显""隐"兼备的激励契约提供了理论依据。By using a sample of state-ownedenterprises of 2010~2014, from the perspective of "political promotion", this research investigates the relationship between the career expectations of executives and state-owned enterprises risk. The results show that higher career expectations can reduce the risk level of state-owned enterprises; we also find agency efficiency represented by enterprise investment efficiency plays a partially mediated role in the relationship between career expectations and enterprises risk. In addition to the path of agency efficiency above, we also use anti-corruption storm as the shocking event to explore the agency cost path, it means that the career expectations can reduce the risk of enterprisesby reducing the agency cost. Further research results also show that there is a two-way substitution effect between cash compensation and career expectations, which provides a theoretical basis for the state-owned enterprises to develop "explicit" and "hidden" incentive contract.

关 键 词：职业生涯预期 企业风险 代理成本 代理效率 反腐败 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]