生态文明建设中的利益相关者博弈研究  

Study on Stakeholder Game in the Ecological Civilization Construction

作　　者：杨加猛[1] 叶佳蓉 王虹[1] 张智光[1] 刘璨 Yang Jiameng;Ye Jiarong;Wang Hong;Zhang Zhiguang;Liu Can(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Forestry University,Nanjing 210037;National Forestry and Grassland Economic Development Research Center,Beijing 100714)

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,南京210037 [2]国家林业和草原局经济发展研究中心,100714

出　　处：《林业经济》2018年第11期9-14,19,共7页Forestry Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“国家生态县生态文明建设的激励机制与引领范式”(编号:13CZZ050)

摘　　要：中央政府、地方政府、企业、公众等多元主体的协同建设,是推进生态文明建设的必然要求。文章首先基于委托-代理模型,探讨了生态文明建设中“中央政府-地方政府”的双方利益博弈,分别模拟了监督和不监督条件下中央政府对地方政府的最优激励以及地方政府的努力水平;其次,构建了“地方政府-企业-公众”完全信息静态博弈模型,分析了在生态文明建设过程中影响三方决策的关键因素;在此基础上,提出了中央政府、地方政府、企业和公众之间的内生化综合激励模型,为多元利益相关者协同参与生态文明建设提供参考建议。The coordinated construction of the central government, local government, enterprises and the social public is an inevitable requirement to promote the construction of ecological civilization. Based on the principalagent model, this paper discussed the bilateral interest game of"central government-local government"in the construction of ecological civilization, and simulated the optimal incentive of the central government to the local government under the condition of supervision and non-supervision, as well as the endeavor level of the local government. Furthermore, this paper assumed a complete information static game model among"local government, enterprise and public", and concluded the key factors affecting the decision-making in the process of ecological civilization construction. Finally, an endogenous incentive model among the central government, local government, enterprises and the social public was put forward to provide a reference for multi-stakeholders to participate in the construction of ecological civilization.

关 键 词：利益相关者 委托-代理模型 生态文明 博弈分析 综合激励 

分 类 号：F307.2[经济管理—产业经济]