面向关键设备系统多层级维修服务的性能合同设计及激励机制  

Performance-Based Contracting Design and Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Indenture Maintenances Service of Mission-Critical Equipment

作　　者：秦绪伟[1,2] 刘虹[1] 蒋忠中[1,2] 纪俊杰 QIN Xuwei;LIU Hong;JIANG Zhongzhong;JI Junjie(School of Business Administration,NOrtheastern University,Shenyang110819,China;Institute of Behavioral and Service Operations Management,NOrtheastern University,Shenyang110819,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110819 [2]东北大学行为与服务运作管理研究所,沈阳110819

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2018年第6期1184-1193,1204,共11页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472034;71371190;71671033;71871038);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N160601001)

摘　　要：近年来,设备制造业商务模式逐渐由卖产品转变为卖服务,性能合同成为管理关键设备生产-服务模式的新兴工具。针对多个供应商与运营商构成的多层级维修服务供应链,引入制造阶段的可靠性能力以及售后阶段的维修能力作为供应商的跨阶段服务能力决策变量,运营商以基于性能的合同(PBC)、基于资源的合同(RBC)为合同选项,采用两阶段序贯博弈为建模框架,研究多层级维修服务合同设计模型,着重分析两类合同对多个供应商投资服务能力的激励机制,发现:RBC导致供应商对可靠性能力投资不足,而PBC过度激励供应商投资可靠性能力。结论表明:可靠性能力和服务供应链结构的复杂性是关键设备服务合同设计的重要决策因素。该结论有助于更深入了解PBC合同的激励机制和无效性根源。Recently the change from goods orientation toward service orientation has extensively transformed the business of manufacturing firms. Performance-based contracting(PBC) has emerged as a new means to manage collaborative relationship in the product-service businesses of mission-critical equipment. The significant characteristics of multi-indenture service supply chain are focused on, where each subsystem of mission-critical equipment is built by independent supplier and where multiple suppliers provide distinct and customized services to support their own subsystems. Each supplier makes intertemporal decisions on the reliability improvement capacity in the development stage and the repair capacity in the after-sales stage. The PBC and the resource-based contract(RBC) are considered respectively by the customer. The two multi-indenture service contract design models are proposed in a two-stage sequential game theory framework. The inter-supplier incentive dynamics resulted in the two contracts is analyzed. The unexpected results reveal that the suppliers using the RBC lack enough incentive to invest in reliability while the PBC results in an overinvestment in reliability. The new findings suggest that the reliability capacity and the complexity of service supply chain structure have a very significant effect on the service contracts design. The analysis helps customers deeply understand the incentive mechanism and the source of inefficiencies of the PBC contract.

关 键 词：基于性能的合同 基于资源的合同 多层级服务供应链 关键设备 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] C93[经济管理—管理学]