员工持股计划中的高管认购行为、业绩操纵与审计监督  

Executive Subscription of the ESOPs,Earning Management and Audit Supervision

作　　者：戴璐[1] 林黛西 Dai Lu;Lin Daixi

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,100086

出　　处：《审计研究》2018年第6期90-96,共7页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号:71772170);青年项目(项目批准号:71302155)的资助

摘　　要：员工持股计划中的高管认购行为是一个相对被忽视的问题,但其对于计划中利益分配的顶层设计而言却十分重要。本文基于2014～2016年的政策期间,以实施员工持股计划的A股上市公司为样本,从高管事前的寻租倾向出发,深入考察并发现:员工持股计划实施前公司的盈余管理程度越高,计划中高管认购的份额越大;进一步地,高管从计划中获取股份之后,会继续进行盈余管理以谋求利益最大化。值得注意的是,在以上各关系中,外部独立审计均扮演着积极的治理角色,对高管谋利行为产生了监督约束作用。本研究加深了对管理层代理问题、盈余管理、外部独立审计的认识,对于员工持股计划的设计和实施也提供了有价值的参考。The issue of executive subscription of ESOPs is often ignored but is critical to the design of ESOPs. From the perspective of executive rent-seeking tendency before ESOPs,using companies which implemented ESOPs from 2014 to 2016 as samples,this paper finds that the executive subscription of the ESOPs is positively correlated with the prior earnings management.Moreover,after the subscription,the executives continue to manipulate earnings to profit personally.It is noteworthy that independent,external auditing functions as an important governance mechanism,restraining the executives'rent-seeking behavior.The study enhances the comprehension of executive agency problem,earnings management and audit supervision,and offers suggestion to the design and implementation of ESOPs plan.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 高管认购行为 盈余管理 审计监督 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.92