企业与政府并购控制的不完全信息动态博弈  

Dynamic game on mergers and government merger-control with incomplete information

作　　者：赵凯[1] 王健[1] ZHAO Kai;WANG Jian(Institute for Quantitative Economics,Huaqiao University,Xiamen 361021,China)

机构地区：[1]华侨大学数量经济研究院,厦门361021

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2018年第11期35-49,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71603087);福建省中青年教师教育科研资助项目(JAS150091)

摘　　要：传统静态研究中,由并购引起的不确定性主要体现为参与并购企业掌握自身生产效率信息,而外部企业无法辨识并购是否会影响参与企业的效率.文章在传统研究基础之上进行动态延伸,假设市场中存在领导者和追随者企业,在序贯决策的框架下研究企业并购动因及并购企业实际盈利.根据并购前后参与企业的市场角色不同,文章研究比较了四种可能发生的并购类型,并证明当并购伴随企业角色改变时,即便存在效率损失,并购仍是有利可图的.此外,文章还从政府政策角度出发,针对政府并购控制的介入时间以及审核标准选择进行了深入的理论探讨.结果证实当政府进行事前干预时,消费者福利标准更加精确、严格;而当政府进行事后干预时,社会福利标准的优势更为明显.In the traditional and static studies,the uncertainty caused by mergers mainly means that the participating enterprises have the information about their own production efficiency,while the external enterprises cannot recognize whether mergers will affect the efficiency of the participating enterprises. As a dynamic extension based on the traditional studies,this paper aims to explore the merger motivations,as well as the actual profit of the merged enterprises within the framework of sequential decision-making,assuming that there are leaders and followers in the market. According to the different roles of the merged enterprises,this paper compares four scenarios of mergers,demonstrating that mergers are profitable with the redistribution of the enterprises’ roles,even the efficiency is reduced. Furthermore,from the viewpoint of merger-control policies,this paper theoretically discusses the timing of policy intervention and the auditing criteria of government mergercontrol. It is shown that when the government adopts"ex-ante intervention",the consumer welfare standard is more precise and rigorous; by contrast,when the government chooses "ex post enforcement",the social welfare standard has more advantages.

关 键 词：并购 不完全信息 反垄断 不确定性 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F273