垄断、信息不对称及土地拍卖定价偏好的差异——以南昌市为例  

Monopoly, Information Asymmetry and Pricing Preference Difference of Land Auction in Nanchang City

作　　者：王雪峰[1] WANG Xuefeng(School of Tourism &Urban Management,Jiangxi University of Finance &Economics,Nanchang330032,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院,江西南昌330032

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2018年第9期43-50,58,共9页China Land Science

基　　金：江西省社科"十二五"(2015)规划项目(15SH04);"江西省普通本科高校中青年教师发展计划访问学者专项资金"

摘　　要：研究目的:探讨土地拍卖出让人和竞买人是否存在定价偏好差异及其原因。研究方法:以拍卖—特征价格模型为基础的计量分析。研究结果:拍卖交易双方本质上都是根据其自身的成本和收益曲线来定价,在一些位置特征、规划特征和竞买规则特征上具有相同的定价偏好,但偏好强度有所差异;交易双方对部分位置特征定价偏好不同,信息不对称是差异产生的重要原因;交易双方对竞买人限制及市场特征有不同定价偏好,原因是政府对土地的卖方垄断;竞买人的拍卖经验和国企身份能够显著地降低成交价。研究结论:拍卖交易双方存在着显著的定价偏好差异,根源在于信息不对称和政府对土地的卖方垄断。The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the pricing preference difference of land auction occurs between seller and bidder and to explore the reasons behind.The method of econometric analysis based on ActionHedonic Price Model is used.The results indicate that:1)the price of land auction is set against the cost and revenue curves regarding seller and bidder,and both sides of transaction have similar pricing preferences to some location, planning and rule characteristics but with various degrees.2)Both sides have different pricing preferences to some location characteristics because of information asymmetry.3)Both sides have different pricing preferences to bidder limitation and market characteristics due to seller's monopoly.4)Characteristics of auction experience and identity of state-owned company can significantly bring the final price of land down.In conclusion,there are significant pricing preference differences between land seller and bidder due to information asymmetry and seller's monopoly of local government.

关 键 词：土地经济 定价偏好 拍卖-特征价格模型 信息不对称 卖方垄断 起拍价 成交价 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]