增强知识产权保护总能促进创新吗?:纳入“干中学”效应的南北框架分析  被引量:9

Does Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Protection Always Promote Innovation? A North-South Study Incoporating Learning-by-Doing

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作  者:杨轶波 Yang Yibo

机构地区:[1]上海财经大学高等研究院

出  处:《世界经济研究》2018年第12期115-131,134,共18页World Economy Studies

摘  要:文章在一般均衡框架下纳入了知识产权保护对生产力的“干中学”效应,并在此基础上讨论开放经济中知识产权保护对创新和经济增长的影响。发展中国家(南方)知识产权保护力度的提升鼓励了技术引进,但也强化了垄断力量,在“干中学”机制下,二者对南方生产力分别具有正向和反向效应。当知识产权保护水平较低时,正向效应占据主导地位,然而当知识产权保护很强时,反向效应将占据主导地位,从而形成知识产权保护和劳动生产力之间的“倒U型”关系。在一般均衡下,这种非线性效应会反馈至发达国家(北方),并使南方知识产权保护与北方创新之间也出现一种“倒U型”的关系。文章进一步从实证角度对南方知识产权保护和生产力之间的关系进行检验,并得到与理论一致的结果。知识产权保护并非越强越好,适度的南方知识产权保护才是最有利于北方创新和全球经济增长的。This study introduces the "learning-by-doing"effect of intellectual property rights protection (IPP)on productivity into the general equilibrium framework,and discusses the impact of IPP on innovation and economic growth in the open economy environment.Stronger IPP in developing countries (South)attracts more foreign direct investment (FDI)and technology transfer from developed countries (North),but also intensifies the monopoly power.Under the mechanism of learning-by-doing,productivity in the South depends on the net outcome of the two competing effects.The net outcome shows that when Southern IPP is relatively weak,strengthening it will lead to an increase in productivity.However,when Southern IPP is sufficiently strong,further strengthening will lower productivity.Hence,there is an inverted-U relationship between Southern IPP and productivity.In general equilibrium,an inverted-U relationship between Southern IPP and Northern innovation exists through the feedback effect. These results suggest a stronger IPP does not always promote innovation.In contrast,a proper IPP level in the South is most desirable for Northern innovation and global economic growth.

关 键 词:知识产权保护 创新 外国直接投资 生产力 干中学 

分 类 号:F204[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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