竞争性制造商成本削减下的信息共享策略研究  

Information Sharing Strategy with Competing Manufacturers under Production Cost Reduction

作　　者：许明辉[1] 孙康泰 杨东升[1] XU Minghui;SUN Kangtai;YANG Dongsheng(Wuhan University,Wuhan,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2018年第12期1872-1882,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371146);武汉大学人文社会科学青年学者团队建设计划资助项目(Whu2016013)

摘　　要：考虑由两个竞争性制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,在零售商拥有更多需求信息且制造商进行成本削减下,在不同信息共享策略下得到供应链成员的均衡决策,从而得到零售商的最优信息共享策略。研究发现:在制造商成本削减有效性较高时,零售商信息共享总会缓解双重边际效用,使得供应链成员利润增加。若无信息合约,当且仅当制造商成本削减有效性较高时,零售商会主动共享信息;在信息合约下,当制造商成本削减有效性较高或市场竞争较为激烈时,零售商会共享需求信息。数值分析表明,在制造商的成本削减能力非对称时,零售商有可能仅对成本削减有效性较高的制造商共享信息。Considering the problem of information sharing in a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and a common retailer,under the condition that the retailer has more demand information and the manufacturer cuts the cost,the equilibrium decision of the supply chain members is obtained under different information sharing strategies,and the optimal information sharing strategy of the retailer is obtained.The results indicate that information sharing mitigates double marginalization and increases the profit of supply chain members when the manufacturers are efficient in cost reduction.Without information contracting,demand information will be disclosed by the retailer voluntarily if and only if the manufacturers are efficient in cost reduction.With information contracting,the demand information is shared by the retailer if the manufacturers are efficient in cost reduction or the competition between them is intense.Numerical study indicates that the retailer is likely to share information only with the manufacturer that is more efficient in cost reduction when the two manufacturers have asymmetric cost reduction efficiency.

关 键 词：供应链管理 信息共享 信息合约 成本削减 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]