股权集中、机构持股与内幕交易:来自沪深A股的经验证据  

Ownership Concentration、Institutional Investors Stockholding and Insider Trading:Empirical Evidence from Shanghai and Shenzhen a Share

作　　者：陈宪[1] 袁娜 陈勇[2] CHEN Xian;YUAN Na;CHEN Yong(Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083;Heng Yang Normal University,Hengyang 421008)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083 [2]衡阳师范学院,衡阳421008

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2018年第10期1186-1205,共20页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

摘　　要：选择2011—2016年沪深A股2158家公司面板数据,借助累计异常换手率衡量内幕交易行为,研究股权集中、机构持股与内幕交易之间的关系.结果表明:股权集中度越高,发生内幕交易的可能性越大,非国有上市公司比国有上市公司发生内幕交易的可能性更大;机构持股能显著减弱上市公司股权集中度过高引发的内幕交易行为,在监管法治不到位的情况下,机构持股能有效抑制上市公司大股东的内幕交易行为.文章研究结论为内幕交易治理提供了经验证据.Taking the panel data of 2158listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock market,using cumulative abnormal turnover to measure the insider trading,this paper analyses the relationship between ownership concentration,institutional investors stockholding and insider trading.The result shows that the higher of ownership concentration of listed companies,the greater the possibility of insider trading.And non-state-owned listed companies are more likely to have insider trading than state-owned listed companies.In view of the institutional investors'stockholding,investment-oriented institutional investors will significantly weaken the insider trading triggered by the ownership concentration.Furthermore,investment-oriented institutional investors can reduce the insider trading effectively in the areas which the legal system is underdeveloped.The conclusion provides evidence for the regulation of the market and corporate governance.

关 键 词：股权集中 机构投资者 内幕交易 累计异常换手率 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]