国会与官僚:美国联邦政府权力制衡的隐性因素  

Congress and Bureaucracy: Recessive Factors of Check and Balances in the Federal Government of the United States

作　　者：石庆环[1] 刘博然 SHI Qinghuan;LIU Boran(School of History,Liaoning University,Shenyang 110136,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学历史学院,辽宁沈阳110136

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2018年第6期203-210,共8页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"美国联邦政府腐败治理研究(1883-1978)"阶段性成果之一(项目批准号:14BSS020)

摘　　要：文章从国会与官僚之间的关系入手,旨在挖掘美国联邦政府权力制衡的多重因素,尤其挖掘鲜为学者关注和研究的国会与官僚二者联手制衡总统权力的隐性因素。在这个意义上,讨论和研究国会与官僚之间的关系,无论对了解美国联邦政府权力构成的多重性与复杂性,抑或对理解官僚集团在美国联邦政府权力结构中所处的位置,都具有十分重要的学术价值和现实意义。This article,starting with the relationship between Congress and bureaucrats,aims to excavate the multiple factors of the check and balancs of the federal government,and especially excavate the recessive factors that the Congress and the bureaucrats,which are rarely concerned with and studied by scholars,jointly check and balance the power of the president.In this sense,the discussion and study of the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy has very important academic values in understanding the multiplicity and complexity of the Constitution of the United States federal government,or in understanding the position of the bureaucratic group in the power structure of the United States federal government.

关 键 词：美国 联邦政府 国会 官僚 分权与制衡 

分 类 号：D521[政治法律—政治学]