基于不完全信息博弈模型的预算效率激励机制设计  

Design of Budget Efficiency Incentive Mechanism Based on Games of Incomplete Information

作　　者：吴俊培[1] 程文辉 Wu Junpei;Cheng Wenhui

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财政研究》2018年第11期71-83,共13页Public Finance Research

基　　金：社科基金项目"完善财政转移支付制度"(批准号:17BJY173)的中间研究成果

摘　　要：绩效预算(PBB)的核心问题是公共产品效率供给的预算制度安排,预算绩效管理是以绩效预算(PBB)为基础。本文构建了不完全信息条件下的部门预算绩效管理模型,分析了绩效信息缺陷对财政、部门博弈策略的影响及导致的后果,提出了整合项目预算、优化绩效目标设置、加强与部门目标管理工作的协调、构建部门间效率竞争机制等建议,设计针对效率的预算激励机制。The essence of performance budgeting is the budget system arrangement for the efficient provision of public goods.This paper establishes a model of project budget performance management under the condition with incomplete information and analyzes the influence and consequences of performance information deficiencies on game strategies of the financial and public good production department.In addition,it proposes some suggestions on designing a budget incentive mechanism to improve efficiency,such as integrating project budgets,optimizing the settings of performance aims,strengthening the coordination of work target management,and creating an efficiency competition mechanism among different departments.

关 键 词：绩效预算 效率激励 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F812.3[经济管理—财政学]