基于非合作博弈的区域港口默契合谋定价机理  

Regional port tacit collusion pricing mechanism based on non-cooperative game

作　　者：钟丹丹 董岗[1] ZHONG Dan-dan;DONG Gang(School of Economics & Management, Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《大连海事大学学报》2018年第4期61-67,共7页Journal of Dalian Maritime University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71774109; 71771143);上海市科研创新计划项目(2017-64)

摘　　要：为研究在日趋激烈的竞争环境中区域港口的定价策略选择,利用Bertrand模型建立单次同时博弈及序贯博弈模型,深入分析区域港口的定价策略内在机理.此外,考虑到单次博弈不足以说明区域港口在长期博弈中的定价策略选择,故对区域港口在无限次重复博弈中的定价机理进行研究,并用算例对模型结果进行验证.研究发现:区域港口在竞争环境中也存在一定程度的默契合谋定价,并且这种默契合谋定价策略会随着博弈次数的增多而逐渐趋于稳定.研究成果对港口资源整合中主管部门加强反垄断规制具有参考意义.In order to study the pricing strategy selection of regional ports in the increasingly fierce competitive environment, the Bertrand model was used to establish a single simultaneous game and sequential game model to deeply analyze the intrinsic mechanism of pricing strategies for regional ports. In addition, considering that the single game is not enough to explain the choice of pricing strategy of regional ports in long-term game, the pricing mechanism of regional ports in infinite repeated game was studied, and the results of the model were verified by examples. It is shown that there is a certain degree of tacit collusion pricing of regional ports in the competitive environment, and this tacit collusion pricing strategy will gradually stabilize with the increase of games number. The results have reference significance for authorities in the port resources integration to strengthen antitrust regulation.

关 键 词：区域港口 BERTRAND模型 非合作博弈 默契合谋 定价机理 

分 类 号：F552[经济管理—产业经济]