葛梯尔式反例的普遍形式与葛梯尔问题的实质  

The General Form of Gettier-style Counterexamples and the Substantive of Gettier Problem

作　　者：周志荣[1] ZHOU Zhi-rong(School of Philosophy,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学哲学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第1期38-43,共6页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(16CZX052);中南财经政法大学高校基本科研业务费项目(2017)

摘　　要：通过对葛梯尔本人提出的两个反例的形式分析,可以发现一个共同的逻辑形式。不难证明所有葛梯尔式的反例都具有这种普遍形式。由该形式可以看出葛梯尔问题的实质,即知识的辩护性条件和真实性条件是彼此分离的,从而使得反例与知识的GK-定义一起逻辑地导出矛盾。传统知识定义与GK-定义在重要的方面存在区别,即它实际上并没有将知识的真实性与辩护分离开来,这使得传统定义可以免受葛梯尔问题的威胁。A general logical form can be found by analyzing Gettier’s original two counterexamples,and it is easy to show that all Gettier-style counterexamples are in this general form. By this form,people can see more clearly the substantive of Gettier problem,which is that the justification condition and the truth condition of knowledge are isolated from each other,and this isolation together with GK-definition of knowledge makes it possible for these counterexamples to drive a contradiction logically. However,traditional definition of knowledge can avoid the threat made by the problem,for it is different from GK-definition in an important aspect.That is,truth and justification are indeed not isolated from each other in the traditional definition.

关 键 词：真 辩护 知识 葛梯尔式反例 葛梯尔问题 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]