“监督管理层”还是“约束大股东”?基金持股对中国上市公司价值的影响  

“Monitoring Managers” or “Restricting Tunneling”? The Effect of Fund's Holding on Firm Value in China

作　　者：曾志远[1] 蔡东玲 武小凯 ZENG Zhiyuan;CAI Dongling;WU Xiaokai(School of Economics/Research Institute of Economics and Management, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学经济学院,四川成都611130；[2]西南财经大学经济与管理研究院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《金融研究》2018年第12期157-173,共17页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文采用2009-2017年中国非金融类上市公司的数据实证检验了基金持股对公司价值的影响,并对两条影响途径(监督管理层和抑制控股股东侵占)做了分析。结果表明:(1)基金持股比例增加显著提升了上市公司价值,且这种促进作用随着控股股东持股比例的上升而增强,同时这种效应只在非国有企业中表现显著,在国有企业中则不显著;(2)按投资策略分类发现,除主动型和被动型基金外,准指数基金持股也可以提升公司价值;(3)在控制了基金数量后,基金持股比例对公司价值的影响显著降低。以上结果表明,与发达国家基金持股主要通过监督管理层来提升公司价值的传导途径不同,我国基金持股对上市公司的积极影响主要体现为对控股股东侵占行为的约束。This paper empirically tests the impact of fund ownership by using the data of China’ s non-finan-cial listed firms during the period of 2009-2017,and compares two mechanisms,"monitoring managers"or"restricting tunneling". We find that:( 1) the equity ownership by funds has a significant positive effect on lis-ted firms’ value,and the effect is stronger in firms where the controlling shareholders held a higher proportion ofstock;( 2) not only active and passive funds significantly increase the firms’ value,quasi index funds also in-crease the firms’ value;( 3) the number of funds holding stock in the firm can significantly enhance the firm val-ue,while the impact of fund ownership significantly decreases when controlling the number of funds. These re-sults suggest the main contributing mechanism of the fund in China is more likely to be restricting the controllingshareholder’s expropriation,instead of monitoring managers.

关 键 词：基金持股 基金类型 控股股东侵占 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275