合同能源管理中超额节能收益分配问题研究  

Investigating Allocation of the Excessive Energy Saving in Energy Performance Contracting

作　　者：张文杰 袁红平 ZHANG Wen-jie;YUNA Hong-ping(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;School of Management,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]广州大学工商管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2019年第1期187-193,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573216);四川省科技计划项目(2017ZR0150);四川省系统科学与企业发展研究中心重点项目(Xq17B04)

摘　　要：在我国合同能源管理项目中,节能收益分享模式被广泛采用。通过构建"委托-代理"模型深入分析节能收益分享模式下的超额节能收益分配问题。研究发现:(1)无论是否出现超额节能收益,合同中用能方的节能收益分享比例不得超过50%;(2)在引入节能服务公司的努力成本系数且不考虑节能改造双方风险偏好的情况下(风险中性),当努力成本系数在特定的取值范围内,优化后的超额节能收益分配方式对节能服务公司更具激励作用;(3)考虑节能服务公司为风险规避时,其最优期望节能收益不但受其努力成本系数的影响,还受其风险规避程度以及节能收益期望方差的影响。For the past few years,shared saving model( SSM) has been prevailing in energy performance contracting( EPC) projects in China. Based on the ‘principal-agent’model,this paper investigates the allocation of excessive energy savings in SSM of EPC projects. The research reveals that the EU’s energy-saving sharing ratio should be no more than 50%,no matter how much excessive energy saving can be achieved. Given that there is an ESCO’s effort cost coefficient and the two parties are both risk-neutral,the optimal approach for allocating excessive energy saving would be more attractive to the ESCO. Furthermore,if the ESCO is risk-averse,its optimal expected energy saving would be influenced by its effort cost coefficient,the degree of risk averse,and the expected variance of energy saving.

关 键 词：节能收益分享 合同能源管理 超额节能收益分配 委托-代理模型 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]