基于零售商社会偏好行为的供应链博弈  

Channel Bargaining with Social Preference Concerned Retailer

作　　者：张鹏[1,2] 马俊 张杰[3] ZHANG Peng;MA Jun;ZHANG Jie(School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;School of Business,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;School of Management,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029 [2]上海对外经贸大学 工商管理学院,上海201620 [3]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第1期155-164,共10页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71171053;71670143;71572034);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-10-0336)

摘　　要：将社会偏好行为引入到供应链合同的研究中,在由一个具有社会偏好行为的零售商与社会偏好中性的供应商组成的二级供应链中,供应链成员双方应用纳什议价机制确定最优批发价格与最优订货量。研究发现,不论是博弈双方具有同等议价能力还是不等议价能力,当满足特定条件时,供应链成员的合作博弈均存在纳什议价均衡解。而且最优均衡订货量与零售商的社会偏好行为无关,最优均衡批发价格是零售商涉他偏好参数的增函数。同时,还将合作协商机制与非合作博弈下的均衡订货量和批发价格结果进行了对比,并讨论了供应链成员的渠道利润比率。最后,通过算例对结果进行了验证。This paper incorporates social preferences in a dyadic channel with one social preference neutral supplier and one social preference concerned retailer,where the supplier and the retailer negotiate about the wholesale price and order quantity by Nash-bargaining.The result shows that there exists a Nash-bargaining equilibrium for the wholesale price and order quantity with equal and unequal bargaining power under special conditions and the order quantity is not affected by the social preference of the retailer,while the wholesale price increases as the retailer concerns the suppler more.This paper then compares the game results between cooperative game and non-cooperative game and studies the channel profit distribution between the two agents.Finally,it gives numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results of the proposed models.

关 键 词：社会偏好 纳什议价 行为供应链 批发价格 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F274