博弈论视角下的PPP模式政府监管研究  

Research on the Government Supervision of PPP Mode Based on Game Theory

作　　者：何一慧 熊华平[1] HE Yi-hui;XIONG Hua-ping(Hengda School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan,430081,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学恒大管理学院,湖北武汉430081

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2018年第6期64-68,共5页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(17D011);武汉科技大学大学生科技创新基金研究项目(17SHA018)

摘　　要：PPP模式在我国公共服务领域的应用日益广泛,越来越多的问题也随之暴露,其中较为突出的是政府监管问题。政府和私人部门的合作,本质上是二者之间博弈的结果。本文以博弈论的视角分别从宏观和微观两个层面利用4种博弈模型来分析PPP模式下私人部门与政府之间的博弈过程,发现政府监管问题的关键在于促进私人部门积极履约。由此结合我国PPP模式下政府监管的不足给出如何加强政府监管的合理建议,旨在促进PPP模式在我国的发展。In China,with the increasing applications of PPP mode in the public service,more and more problems are emerging. Among those problems,government supervision is one of the prominent problems. The cooperation between government and private sector is essential for the game between them. Based on game theory,this paper analyzes the game between private sector and government in the PPP mode by using four game models at macro and micro levels. It finds that the key of the government supervision is to motivate the private sector to fulfill the contract actively. Given the deficiency of government supervision in PPP mode,this paper proposes a few reasonable suggestions on how to strengthen government supervision to promote the development of PPP mode in China.

关 键 词：PPP模式 博弈论 政府监管 私人部门 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]