政府主管部门与市政公用企业的博弈分析  

Game analysis between government branches and utility enterprises

作　　者：张勇[1] 张世英[1] 程振华[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]中华人民共和国建设部,北京100835

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2002年第2期83-90,共8页Journal of Management Sciences in China

摘　　要：市政公用设施具有公共性、福利性、外部性、垄断性、超余性和秩序性的经济学特征 .政府主管部门与市政公用企业间存在着委托代理关系 .模型分析的结论证明了 :计划经济体制下市政公用企业享受的“先用后算、多用多补”的补贴政策是导致激励弱化、成本失控、政府负担加重的根本原因 ;改革初期的“补贴包干”政策在调动企业积极性、减轻政府负担方面取得了一定的成效 ,但是这种做法仅局限于对企业的放权让利 ,还存在很多缺陷 ;建立现代企业制度及政府主管部门与市政公用企业间的委托代理关系 ,完善激励机制 ,可以最大限度地满足社会效益和企业效益的需求 ,是市政公用事业改革的必然出路 .In this paper, some economic characteristics of public utility enterprises are summed up, a model of principal agent theory between government branches and the enterprises is proposed. It is proved through the game analysis that the government budget policy is the key reason to arise stimulation feeble and cost increasing for the enterprises under the planed economic system. The initial reform, though with some defects, improved the efficiency of the utility enterprises, and shows that it should be an inevitable layout for utility enterprises to establish modern enterprises system and to formalize the principal agent relationship between the government branches and public enterprises.

关 键 词：政府 市政公用企业 委托代理 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济]